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IN ~fHE SUPREME COURT
OF 1'HE STATE OF lJTAH
)lERY~~ ,J. RUS.SE~.L ancl 1\D,\

.J. RUSSELL, lus wife,

\
)

P1aintilf s and Hcs1Ju11rlc.·1ts.
VS

I

·

(~EYSER-_MARION GOLD ~IIX-

2NG COiiIP ANY. a corporation,
THE BOTH,VELL CORPORAT I (E'\. a corporation, et al,

).

Case No.

io

577

Defendants and A jJjdlants. /

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

The respondents do not agree with the appellants'
statement of facts appearing in their brief under the
headings "Cndi:-;puted Facts'', pp. 2-7 awl "Argument
011 the Facts'·, pp. 7-Hi. Yery pertinent facts are omitted. ...:\lso, the appellants ha1·e eonsistently ignored
facts \\"h:eli support the findings of the trial court, and
1
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have relied heavily upou evidence which the trial eourt
obviously did not belie,'e. The respondents will be rcf ered to as the "plaintiffs" and the appellants will be
ref erred to as the "defendants."

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The subject matter of this litigation consists of
43 patented mining claims. Oue group, hereinafter
referred to as the "Upper Group", consists of 12 elaims
located in a mountainous area north of the old town
of Mercur in Tooele County; and the other group,
hereinafter referred to as the "Lower Group" eonsists
of 31 claims located on the sagebrush bench a few miles
southwest of Mercur. The 12 claims included in the
Upper Group are:
Black Shale, Lot 3029, Hecla, Hecla Nos. 1,
2, 3, and 4, area 66.21 ac.; Douglas No. 1, area
27.83 ac.; Buena Vista, Gold Button, .Marv .J ea11
Fraction, l\iary Jean Nos. land 2, area 57.25 ac.
The 31 claims included in the Lower Group are:
Quartet No. 1, Kansas Boy, Kansas lloy
Fraction, Kansas Boy No. 3, Kansas Boy No. +,
and Garnet Mountain, area 80.973 ac.; Syndicate Nos. 1 and 2, Monopolist Nos. 1 to 8, LaCigale Mining Dist. area 107.40 ac.; 'Vest Shore,
Selma, Sister .Mary, 'Vest Selma, Alice, Four
o'clock, Esther, Maggie Kelly, Houest Diek.
Lola Barker and Black Sheep, LaCigale, Mining Dist., area 184.27 ae.; Ivanhoe, Coin awl
Tr~r Agaiu, Albion, area 64.376 ac. in l\Iercur
.:\fining Dist.
2
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The maps, Exhibits 18, ID and :!O, sho-.1· the lucatiu11s
of the claims.
Tl1e claims are 11ot fe11eed 11or otherwise marked
oil the ground (Tr. "27). The only ties on the ground

of the Upper Group were to an area k11mn1 as the
":.Iilk Raneh" which is loeated at the junetion of ~lereur
Canyon and :;\Ieaduw Canyon and to the "Sparrow
Hawk Spring,'' located in ~lercm Ca11yon some distaue<.: north of the .Milk Ranch. lt will be noted b~, an
examination of plaintiffs' Exhibit :d that tlie .\lilk
Raueli awl Sparrow Hawk Spring arc loeated imme<li~: teJy north and a little east of the Northwest corner
of Section 5, Township G South, Rauge 3 'Ve~t, SLB&M. Exhibit 21 is a topographie map and clearly indicates tLe l'.anyons and springs. By referring to the
sections designated on plaintiffs' Exhibit 19 which shows
the mining claims and section lines, the general area
covered by the Upper Group can be determined. The
Hecla group consisting of 5 claims is located south and
cast of the Milk Ranch and the other 7 claims in th.'
C pper Group are rather widely scattert>rJ tf1 thr north
arnl northeast of the Milk Ranch.
l\Iuch of the testimony in the record regarding the
grazing of livestock on the mining claims is general
in nature. Smne of the testin1011y is tied to the Milk
Ranch all<l Sparow Hawk with respect to tlie Upper
l; rou p a1 :d to the cemetery on the he11eli be low ;\Iercur
l an.\·011 witli respect to the Lower Group. Other testiil1011.1' ,.,·as based on anJwed knowledge of the location
of the claims.

.3

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Both parties assert ownership based on rccor.!
title to the mining claims. The appellants' statement
regarding the pertinent conveyances of the claims i,
not complete, and an agreement which preceded by :1
f nv days the conveyance of May 24<, l!J34< from Samuel
.T orgensen and wife to Glen R. Bothwell is complete]~·
ignored. The deeds from Samuel .T orgensen an<l wife
to Geyser-Marion and to Glenn R. Bothwell effectually
severed the grazing rights from the mineral rights and
thereafter the records disclose two separate chains of
title. The appellants' chart and discussion of the chaiu
of title coyering "grazing rights" is not complete. The
complete list of recorded documents conyeying th~
grazing rights follows :

Grazing Ri,qhts
Parties
Samuel .;fprgensens to
A. C. Nordell
George J orgensens to
.Merlin Johnson
l\Ierlin Johnson to
A. C. Nordell
A. C. Nordell to
Tony Castagno
Tony Castagno to
Rose Castagno
Tony Castagno to
Rose Castagno
Rose Castagno to
Joseph Rothe
Joseph Rothe to Menin
J. Russell and wife

Dnlc

.Abstract Entries

~-11-;JU

110

:z- rn-:rn

111

:J- l 7 -JU

11 :.!

U- :.'- t.J

15·1

t-28-:rn

Exhibit z;)

11- :3-GO

Exhibit 22

l~-l::HiO

Supp. Abs. p. 5

~:2-1-±-()0

Supp. r\..bs. p. 'i
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The appellants' statement of facts omits ExhiL:t

17 ( ll. Gl-62) which provides:

"AGREEMENT
This agreement, made the 8th day of .May,

1934, by and between Samuel Jorgensen a~d

}Iary Jorgensen, his wife, and George .A ..Torgensen and Rose Jorgensen, his wife, hereinafter
designated as the Sellers and Glenn R. Hotln~'ell,
a single man hereinafter designated as the bu>·er,
Witnesseth,

'YHEREAS, the sellers are indebted t,i the
receiver of The Tooele State Bank i11 the sum
of $11,600.00, and
'VHEREAS, the buyer has submitted to said
receiver an off er to pay said receiver the sum of
$7,500.00 to purchase the bank's interest in t;1~
abow obligatwns and the securities held, which
off er is being considered by the said receiver but
must be submitted to the District Court for final
confirmation which it is expected will be given,
NOYV THEREF_OR, for and in consideration of One Dollar in hand paid each to the
other, it is mutually agreed as follows by the
parties hereto;
Sellers agree to co~vey to buyer upon deli,·e1-y
to them of a_ll of the obligation against them now
held by the bank and buyer agrees to accept such
conveyance and to cancel all of such obligations
in case he is able to become the purchaser as
stated above, the following described property;
to wit,
( Deseiptiou of all of the mining claims iurnked in this suit.)

5
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Subject to grazing rights which arc rescnec!
by the Sellers.

IN "TJTNESS \VHEREOF the parties
hereto have hereunto set their hands,"
(Signatures and acknowledgment)
On page 5 of the appellants' brief appears the foj.
lowing:
"From and after 1944 Owen Ault grazed livestock on and leased all of said mining claims
from and paid rental to defendant each and every
year until the commencement of this action." ·
Statements to the same effect appear on p. 6. The
writer of appellants' brief makes the statement:
"Ault ran HOO head of sheep on said claims
for 20 years, '1'146-11"
It will be noted by turning to page H6 of the transcript
that there is no reference to running sheep on the mining claims. Page 154 of the transcript is also cited iu
support of a similar statement. The testimony on that
page has ref ere nee onl~· to the leasing of claims. Other
references to the transcript on page 6 of the appellants'
brief are erroneous and misleading. See Tr. 26, .J.6, 48 .
.53 and 159. The witnesses were testifying regarding
the grazing of livestock with respect to a grazing line
established by the Bureau of Land Management. The
testimony did not refer to specifie mining claims.

Evidence refuting the appellants' assertion uwler
the heading, "Crnlisputed Facts", that the clefewlaub'

6
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les.~<:c gra:,r,ed liYestock on the mining claims C\Try year
since l DJ..J. is summari:,r,ed below:

O•se11 Ault testified that he herded sheep 011 lhc
}lcrcur Beneh only three times and several times small
bu11el1es of sheep drifted down to the graveyard. (Tr.
187-189). 'Ve quote:
"(~. ~ow those are the only times that you 'vc
ever had your sheep and held them on the ::\ [ereur
Beneh or in the Yicinitv of the Mereur Bench.
is that right?
.

A. \Vhen I have trailed them around there
that I have told you.

<-.l. Those three times. pli:s tlie times that some
have drifted down?
A. Yes." (Tr. 189).

It will be noted that :n of the 43 claims inrnlved
JJl this suit are located on Mercur llench. See Exhibit
rn. (Tr. 49).
Tony Castagno never saw .Ll.ulfs sheep
Lower Group of claims. (Tr. -1<9).

0;1

the

'fhe findings of fact, conclusions of law and decree
are based on the record ownership by the plainfiffs of
the gra:,r,ing rights on the mining claims. They are not
based on ad verse use ( R. ()8-72) .
Findin<)'
No. 3 that: "For many
years last i)ast the
b
• •
plailltiffs and their predeeessors in interest ha,·e li':cd
the s11rfaee of said mining claims for livestock grazing"
( H. ()!)) is supported by competent evidenee. Sel

7
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the transcript pages, 5-8; 46; 64; 66-88; 93-95;

()(j;

!JI;

104-107; 134.

This evidence is important to show that the plaintiffs and their predecessors were seized or possessed o'.'
the property within seven years before commencemeni.
of the action, as required by section '78-12-5 Utah Code
Ann. 1953 and to show that the successive owners of
the mining claims made use of the reserved grazing
rights. This is one of the circumstances which supports
the trial court's construction of the agreement, Exhibit 17 and the deeds dated June 7, 1932 (See Abtract, Ex. 15, Entry 103) and the deed dated .i.\la>·
24, 1934 (Ex. 2).
Another significant fact ignored by the def cndants
statement of facts is the decree quieting title to the
.Black Shale claim in which the court in 1936 held that
Geyser-Marion had title subject to the rights resened
by the J orgensens in the 1932 deed. The language of
the decree is:
Subject, however, to the following:
"The rights reserved by the defendants George
A. Jorgensen and Rose Jorgensen, his wife, ancl
Samuel J o,.rgensen and Mary Jorgensen, his
wife, in that certain deed executed by said last
named persons, recorded September 19, 1932,
in Book 3-S of Deeds at page 17.3, in the office
of the Countv Reeorcler of Tooele Countv, Ctab.
and that the. title of said Geyser Mari;m Gold
.Miuiug Compau~., :~ corporation, the plaintiff
herein, to said premises, property, arnl minin1;
claims is hereby adjudged to be quieted agains:
8
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all claims and demands or prete11sions of the
defendants, or either or anv of them, said defendan~s .and each of them bei~1g hereby perpetually
en.Joined from setting up any claim to said premises, property and mining claims or to any pa~·t
thereof." See Ex. 15, Entry 109.
It will be noted that not only Geyser-Marion and
the J orgensens were parties to the decree, but also the
administrator of the Estate of Glenn R. Bothwell, the
grantee in the 1934 deed from the J orgensens was a
party. After the decree quieting title in them to the
'surface rights", the Jorgensens by a deed dated Fcbrnar,\' 11, 1939 conveyed the "grazing rights" to A. C.
X ordell, one of plaintiffs' predecessors.
The 1932 deed to Geyser-l\Iarion in which smfacc
rights were reserved described not only the Black Shale
claim, but also the other 12 claims in the Upper Group.
The Hecla and Hecla Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 were conveyed
by Bothwell to Geyser-Marion in 1934. (Ex. 1.5,
Entry 115). This was two years before the decree
<1uieting title.
The eYidence is conclusive that the only taxes
assessed against the mining claims during the perio<l
Hl4() to 1960 were against the mineral rights (Ex. ()).
eudell H. Anderso11, Tooele
See also the testimony of
County Assessor, that the surface rights on the mining
l'laims were neYer assessed for taxation (Tr. 12U, 127).
Dmi11g the trial ~Ienin .T. Russell was asked whether
lie "as willing to pay taxes if the court found he was
obligated to pay and he ans\\'ered '·yes" A formal
tender was made (Tr. 29).

"r
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STATEl\IENT OF POINTS
1. The findings of fact are supported by competent

evidence.

2. The language in the Jorgensen deed resencd
grazing rights which passed to the plaintiffs by deeds
of record.
3. Appellants' points based
merit.

011

equity are withou'

4. Statutes of limitation lmYe no application.

ARGUMENT
THE FINDINGS OF FACT ARE SLTP.
PORTED BY COMPETENT EYIDENCK
1.

Clotworthy v. Clyde, 1 Utah 2d 251, 263 P. 2d 420,
states a settled principle in this jurisdiction regarding
the findings of fact as found by the trial judge:
"'i\There the trial court has looked to surrournling circumstances to determine intent because
instruments of title leave ambiguity or uncertainty as to intent, the Supreme Court will uot
disturb the trial court's findings nor judgment
bi0 ed thereon unless the weight of the evidence
is clearly against them or trial court has misapplied principles of law or equity." (Emphasis
added).
The above rule that the trial court's findings of
fact will uot be overturned uuless clearly against tlic

10
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e\·idcnce has been applied by the Supreme Court i11
both cases of law (Jensen v. Howell, 75 Utah 64) 282
P. 10;H) and cases of equity (Metropolitan Investment Company vs. Sine, 14 Utah 2d 36, 376 P.2d 940).
The Trial Court's findings of fact were as follows:
(I) Plaintiffs are owners of the exclusive
right to use for livestock grazing purposes the
surface of the mining claims provided the grazing be done in such manner as not to interfere
with mining ( R. 68, 69).

( 2) For many years last past plaintiffs and
their predecessors in interest haYe used the surface of the mining claims for grazing ( H. G9) .
( 3) Plaintiffs shall pay one-half of the taxes
assessed annually against the mining claims as
long as they are not used for mining purposes.
Use of the land for mining would be within the
knowledge of the mining company and may not
be apparent to the surface users. The surface
users would be obliged to pay one-half the taxes
upon demand or notice ( R. 69) .
Taking the findings of fact separately and looking
to the record it is certain that the evidence very clearly
supports the findings.
Ref erring to Finding No. (I) above, plaintiffs claim
their right through the grantors named in the deed,
Defendants' .Exhibit No. 2. That deed effectually
severed the grazing rights from the miueral rights.
See the chain of title to the grazing rights, page -t of
this brief. Rending the language of the deed in light
of the surrounding circumstances including the agree-

11
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ment between the original parties entered into shortl.r
before the deed was executed (Plaintiffs' Exhibit No.
17, R. 61 and pages 5-6 of this brief) it becomes obYious
that the parties to that deed intended that the grantor
retain the grazing rights. The matter of the construetion
of the deed is more fully discussed under Point :.!.
As to Finding No. ( 2), the testimony clearly shows
possession by the plaintiffs and their predecessors of
the surface of the mining claims for many years lust
past. See page 7 of this brief, also see the followi11g
pages of the transcript: 5-8; 46; 64; 66-88; 93-95; 9();
97; 104-107; and 134. It should be noted that clefernlants' leasee only had his sheep on 31 of the .J.3 claims
three times over a period of nearly 30 years. Sec p•1gc 7'
of this brief, see also Tr. 187-189.
On the third point, there was no evidence produced
which would show that defendants gave notice to plaintiffs or demanded the payments of the taxes. It is clear
that if defendants did use the claims for mining purposes this might not be apparent to the plaintiffs, because of underground operations. Defendant is in the
best position to know if mining is being done on the
claims or not. It should be noted that plaintiffs cluring
the trial agreed to pay any taxes the court fouwl they
were obligated to pay and made a formal tender of the
taxes (Tr. 29).
On the basis of the eYiclence before the co mt th'
evidence clearly supports the findings of fact and, therefore, they should not be disturbed.

12
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:!. THE LANG-UAGE OF THE JORGENSEN DEED RESERYED GRAZING RIGHTS
"'HICH PASSED TO THE PLAINTIFFS llY
DEEDS OF RECORD.

The deed through which both parties claim title, referred to herein as the "Jorgensen deed", is from Samuel and George Jorgensen and their wives to Glenn R.
Bothwell and is dated May 24, 1934. It describes all of
the mining claims involved in this suit and others and
contains the following language:
"The Grantee herein agrees that the Granton;
shall have the right to use the surface of the
ground for grazing purposes, the grazing to be
done in such a manner as not to interfere with
any mining that the Grantee elects to do. The
Grantors agree to pay one-half of the general
taxes assessed against the land, as long as it is
not used for mining purposes."
The plaintiffs contend and the trial court found that
the language quoted above constitutes a reservation b~·
the grantors of the grazing rights on the mining claims;
that grazing rights are property rights and that there
is an unbroken chain of title to the grazing rights hr
deeds of record from the J orgensens to the plaintiffs.
See page 4 of this brief.
The law is well settled that the language of n deed
is construed according to the intention of the parties
as determined from the generally accepted meaninµ·
of th~ words when applied to the subject matter ancl

13
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read in light of the surrounding circumstances of tLc
parties at the time of execution.
The case of Coltharpe v. Coltharpc, 4<8 Utah :38!' .
P. 121, states the rule for construing the langu;1g.
of a deed as follows:

mo

"The rule of construction applicable to instruments of writing, including deeds, in this
jurisdiction is that the intention of the parties,
as the same is made apparent from the ordinary
and generally accepted meaning of the language
used by them when applied to the subject matter
of the writing in light of the surrounding circumstances of the parties at the time, controls
rather than mere technical words, and phras~s."
See also: 'Vood, et al, vs. Ashby, et al, 122 l'tali
580, 253 P. 2d 351.
Also, the modern trend is that the intention of the
parties when manifest or ascertained will prevail over
all technical rules of construction. 26 C.J.S. 807; 2li
C.J.S. lOll, 1012; Haynes vs. Hunt, 96 Utah 348, 85
P.2d 861.
A reservation in a deed is defined as "some right i:1
favor of the gnmtor created out of, or retained i11 the
granted premises." Dubois YS. Judy, 126 NE HH. :ZUl
Ill. 340.
In Johnson vs. Peck, 90 Utah 544, 63 P.2<1 251.
this Court defined a reservation as the creation in belwlt'
of the grantor of a new right issuing out of the thin;:,
granted, something which did not exist as an iudepcrnl·
ent right before the grant.

14
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It will be observed that the la11guage in the deed
in question creates out of the property conveyed rights
in favor of the grantors (grazing rights) which did not
exist as an independent right before the grant. The
language of the deed fits squarely within the definition.
"Fhat is the effect of the reservation? It caned
out of the fee simple title certain rights, which thereafter may be conveyed by the grantors. The grantee
did not get such reserved rights and therefore could
not pass them on. It has been held:
'Vhere a grantor reserves a right, interest, estate
or easement in conveyed land the grantee and his successors in interest take subject to the restrictions imposed.
City of Missoula vs. Mix, 214 P.2d 22, 123 .Mont.
365.

A right or interest reserved in a conveyance will
be effective as against all who deraign title through the
grantee.
Malamphy vs. Potomac Edison Co. ('V. ,-a.) 8:3

SE 2d 755.
An exception of an interest in land contained in a
deed is notice to the grantor and his successors.
Brown vs. Mathis (Ga.) 41 SE 2d 137.
\Vhat was the intention of the parties?
The land described in the deed is suitable for graz;mg on the surface and the sub-surface is suitable for

15
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mining. The grantors of the deed, Exhibit No. :!, were
ranchers and interested in having assured rights t(1
graze their cattle. The grantee on the other hand mh
interested in mining and it is apparent from the h11guage of the deed that the grazing by the grantors w1h
not to interfere with the mining by the grantee. )~ut.
no other limitation was placed upon the grazing right.
lly looking at the surrounding circumstances, it
can be seen that on .May 8, 1934, the grantors and tlw
grantee of the deed in question, Defendants' Exhibit
No. 2, entered into a preliminary agreement for the
sale of the land, Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 17, pages 5-li
of this brief. The language, "Subject to grazing rights
which are reserved by the Sellers'', clearly shows the
parties' intentions. The grantor intended to cmffey th~;
land, but reserved a part of the bundle of rights making
up the fee-the grazing rights. And, the grantee intended to accept something less than the fee-a tit!,'.
subject to the grantors' grazing rights.

,

•

It is evident that both parties to the deed treated
the language as a reservation which passes with the
land. The J orgensens intended to retain a proper'.;·
right because they conveyed it by Warranty Deed [()
A. C. Nordell. See Exhibit 15, Entr~· 110. The deed •
to Nordell was recorded.
The evidence shows, (Defendants' Exhibits :\1m.
7, 8, 9, and 10), that after A. C. Nordell had ac(1uirc1:
the grazing rights he paid one-half of the taxes as stipu
lated in the deed, year after year, and the owner of tk
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mmmg claims, Bothwell Corporation, accepted those
payments. The acceptance of the payments conclusiyel~·
shows that the Bothwell Corporation recognized the
property right which existed in Nordell and it also
shows that the Bothwell Corporation recognized that
the intention of the original parties was to have the
grazing rights remain with the grantors.
Looking to the language of the deed, we see that
with respect to the grazing right, no specific person
is uamed but, the general terms "grantors" and "grantee" are used. There is nothing to imply a life estate
or lesser interest. Section 52-1-2, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, provides: "The term 'heirs' or other technical
words of inheritance or succession are not requisite
to transfer a fee in real estate." Metropolitan Investment Company vs. Sine, 14 Utah 2d 36, 376 P.2d 940,
an action to quiet title by discounting a covenant in
a deed, holds:
"The words 'assigns, etc.' omitted from a restrictive covenant does not necessarily preclude
a finding that the restriction runs with the land
in a given case where the intentions of the parties
and surrounding circumstances warrant such a
finding ... where the duration of the restrictive
covenant is not specified, the covenant will be
limited to such time as seems reasonable, considering the nature of the circumstances of the
case ancl the purpose of its imposition."
Thus, it is clear that the omission of the words of
inheritance in the resenation has 110 effect. It is still
the intention of the parties which controls.
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The language of the reservation contains a restriction of the grazing right. It says: " ... the grazi11'''
to be <lone in such a manner as not to interfere wit1 1
any mining that the grantee elects to do.'' Therefore,
the only limitation on the grazing right is that it shal!
not interfere with the mining. As there is no evidence
in this case that grazing interfered with the mi11i:1g.
it is clear that the grazing right has not been terminated.
This deed indicates that it was the intention of the
original parties to the deed that the grantors should
have the surface grazing rights perpetually unless thcr2
was interference with mining. That this was the intc11tion is shown by the conduct of the parties, name]:,-.
recorded conveyances of grazing rights for nearl;· :in
years which gave notice of the right and were not cuntested by Bothwell or his successors.
I°)

The decree quieting Geyser-l\1arion's title to the
lllack Shale claim, subject to outstanding surface right~;
in the J orgensens, is significant in that it clearly treat.·;
such rights as propert~r rights. It is especially important because Geyser-Marion owned all of the uppu
group of claims when the decree was entered. See page'
8-9 of this brief.
\Vi th regard to the agreement, Ex. 17, it was part
of the surrounding circumstances at the time the deed
·was executed and thus could properly be considered
to show the intent of the parties expressecl in an ambiguous deed. 26 S.J.S. Sec. 91, p. 840, Note :2. [11 r'
Anderson's Estate. :235 P. 2d G70, IGO C}i. :2d 5-'5~.
Standring Y. Mooney, 127 P. 2d 401, 14 \Yash. :Zd :2~~L.
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The case cited by defendants, Knight vs. Southern
Pacific Railroad, 52 Utah J2, 172 P. 693, as support
for the rule that a written contract to convey real proprrty is merged into a deed is not in point. In that case
there was no ambiguity in the deed. The problem of
examining extrinsic evidence to determine the intention
of the parties was not involved.
Considering all of the above, plaintiffs submit that
the intent of the parties at the time the deed was executed as evidence by the language in the deed, the
surrounding circumstances, and the action of the parties
to the deed and their successors is clearly shown to be
that the grazing rights were reserved by the grantors.
3. THE APPELLANTS' POINTS BASED
ON EQUITY ARE VVITHOUT MERIT.
The appellant contends that the maxims of equity:
"He who seeks equity must do equity" (Points VI
and VII) and "Equity will not enter an order impossible to enforce" (Point X) apply in this case. It is
argued that the first maxim applies because the plaintiff
has not paid one-half the general taxes. The deed proYides that the grantors are to pay "one-half the general
taxes assessed against the land, as long as it is not used
for mining purposes." The record is clear: ( 1) That
the only taxes assessed are not geueral taxes but taxes
assessed Ly the State Tax Commission pursuaut to
Chapter 59-G U.C.A. 1953 against the mineral rights,
and ( 2) That the plaintiff tendered one-half of the taxes
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if the court found they were due (Tr. 29). This wa,
clearly an offer to do equity. Further, the defernliwls
are in no position to complain because they han eoL
lected rental on the plamtiff s' grazing rights since rn i:.
In the year 1944 they collected rent from Mr. A.ult
and one-half the taxes from Mr. Nordell! (Sec Ex.i.
7, 8, 9 and 10 and Tr. 168, 200, 204, and 2fi0).
''Tith respect to the second maxim, it is contended
that because of the location of the mining claims it is
impossible for the plaintiffs to use them without trespassing. The Lower Group of claims comprising :;1
are in a single block and are adjacent to Bureau of
Land :Management land on which the plaintiff~> !um
a grazing permit (Tr. 10, 11). The Upper Group
are "checker boarded" with Bureau of Land "'.\Iauag,·ment tracts and private tracts. The undisputed eridc11cc
shows that the 12 claims in dispute are on the plaintiffs'
side of a grazing line established by the 13ureau ol
Land Management (Tr. 10, 102, 104, and 105).

Also, it is well known that practical exchanges <i!°
use of land-locked parcels are frequently made betwcc:; .
the government and private landowners to aYoid trespass.
It is apparent that the maxims of equity haYe no
application to this case.
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-t.. STATUTES OF LIMITATION HAYI~~

XO APPLICATION.

The defendants contend that the plaintiffs' cause
of action is barred by statutes of limitation: Section
78-12-23 (Point IV) and 78-12-5.1, 78-12-5.2, 78-1212.l and 78-12-12 (Point VIII). The argument in
support of Point IV is that this is an action "to recoyer
mesne profits of real property" or is an action on a
written contract and is therefore barred by the six year
statute. The mere statement of the argument refutes
it. This is an action to quiet title to a real property right.
The plaintiffs are not seeking to recoYer "mesne profits"
from the defendants nor from Ault. The only issue
1s the ownership of grazing rights.
'\Tith respect to Point VIII it is assumed by the
defendants that the defendants because they leased
the grazing rights to Ault had "exclusive possession",
that therefore the plaintiffs and their predecessors had
no possession and that therefore the plaintiffs were not
in possession within seven years and had no standing
to bring suit. It is also apparently argued that the
plaintiffs have not acquired title by adverse possession
because they have not paid taxes and been in exclusive
possession for seYen years.
The competent evidence of the grazing of sheep
and cattle on the unfenced claims is set out in the statement of facts. This constitutes possession to meet the
rec1uirements (possession within seven years) of the
0111~· statute of limitations which is at all applicable,
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Section 78-12-5 and this statute was not pleaded a11(\
therefore cannot be considered. See Rule 9 (h), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. See also Tanner v. Proy0
Res. Co., 78 Utah 158, 168, 2 P.2d 107.

CONCLUSION
The trial court's ruling that the grantor intended :
by the ambiguous .Jorgensen deed to reserve grazing 1
rights is supported by competent extrinsic evidence 1
consisting of (a) the practical construction by the 1
parties, (b) the recognition of Bothwell Corporation
of grazing rights subsequently conveyed to Nordell,
( c) the eight deeds of record conveying grazing rights
from the J orgensens to the plaintiffs over a period of
thirty-years which were never attacked by GeyserMarion or its predecessors, ( d) the use of the miuing
claims by the plaintiffs and their predecessors including f
the J orgensens from 1934 to the commencement of
this action and ( e) the unambiguous agreement, Ex.
17, dated a few days before the .Jorgensen deed and a'
a part of the same transaction which spelled out specifically that the grazing rights were reserved. The judgment of the trial court shoulcl be affirmed.
1

Respectfully 5ubmitted,

E. J. SKEEN

Attorney for Respondents
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